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1. Introduction 
Since its emergence following the Enterprise Act 2002 reforms to the administration process, the 
pre-packaged administration sale has been a constant topic of debate, discussion and review. 
Following the publication of the ‘Graham Review into Pre-pack Administration’ (“Graham Review”) 
in June 2014,1 a number of industry-led reforms were introduced in 2015 to address the core issues 
identified therein. As recommended by the Graham Review, the Government reserved the power to 
introduce subsequent legislation should the proposed self-regulation not work.2 It is in this context 
that the Insolvency Service announced in December 2017 that it would be contacting a variety of 
interested parties to assess the impact of the voluntary industry measures, and consider whether to 
impose conditions.3 This period has also seen developments in similar processes and attitudes 
towards them in other jurisdictions. It is pertinent, therefore, to reflect on the nature and impact of 
the voluntary industry measures, developments in the approach to pre-packs internationally, and to 
consider what further action may be taken. 
 
2. The pre-pack administration 
A pre-pack, or pre-packaged sale, is commonly understood as defined in paragraph 1 of Statement of 
Insolvency Practice 16 (“SIP 16”), being an “arrangement under which the sale of all or part of a 
company’s business or assets is negotiated with a purchaser prior to the appointment of an 
administrator and the administrator effects the sale immediately on, or shortly after, appointment.”4 
A slightly more limited working definition was adopted by the Graham Review, focusing on 
“[a]rranging the sale of all or part of a company’s undertaking before formal insolvency is entered, 
with the sale to be executed at or soon after the appointment of an administrator.”5  
Initially unregulated following acceptance of the process by the courts,6 pre-packs were subject to 
much early criticism and a number of issues were identified.7 As the process became regulated by 
                                                          
1 T Graham, ‘Graham Review into Pre-pack Administration: Report to the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP’ (The 
Insolvency Service June 2014) available at <www.gov.uk/government/publications/graham-review-into-pre-
pack-administration> accessed 14 January 2018 
2 Graham (n 1) para 9.38 and Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) Schedule B1 para 60A as introduced by Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 s 129 
3 Insolvency Service, ‘Review of the pre-pack industry measures’ (Gov.uk, 12 December 2017) 
<www.gov.uk/government/news/review-of-the-pre-pack-industry-measures> accessed 14 January 2018 
4 Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 version 3, available at 
<www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/technical_library/SIPS/SIP%2016%20Version%203%20Nov%202015.pdf> 
accessed 14 January 2018 
5 Graham (n 1) para 5.15 With the vast majority of pre-packs involving business, as opposed to simple asset, 
sales, this distinction is not significant, though it is interesting 
6 DKLL Solicitors v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2007] EWHC 2067 (Ch) 
7 See for example Walton, P, ‘Pre-packaged administrations - trick or treat?’ Insolv. Int. 2006, 19(8), 113-122; 
Frisby, S ‘A preliminary analysis of pre-packaged administrations: A summary’ (R3, August 2007) available at 
<www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/publications/press/preliminary_analysis_of_pre-packed_administrations_-
the profession through the introduction of and revisions to SIP 16,8 it has become an integral part of 
the insolvency framework, especially in the context of going concern sales in administration.9 
  
3. The sunset clause 
Following the recommendations of the Graham Review, the Small Business, Enterprise and 
Employment Act 2015 introduced two small, but potentially significant changes to Schedule B1 of 
the Insolvency Act 1986. A new paragraph 60(2) created the potential to limit the broad powers 
afforded to administrators by Schedule 1 IA 1986, providing that “... the power to sell, hire out or 
otherwise dispose of property is subject to any regulations that may be made under paragraph 60A 
[of Schedule B1 IA 1986]”10 (hereafter referred to simply as disposals). Paragraph 60A introduced a 
sunset clause, allowing the Government to make provision in respect of a disposal by an 
administrator to a connected party. This power was time limited, expiring on the fifth anniversary of 
its coming into force.11 With a hard deadline of 25 May 2020 to work to, and a tight parliamentary 
schedule over the remainder of the current Parliament for any change to be approved by both 
Houses,12 the Government is reviewing the position now.  
There is considerable scope for reform within paragraph 60A, and it is not limited to pre-pack 
administrations. Reforms could be introduced in respect of any disposal by an administrator to a 
connected person, with no mention of timing of the sale.13 Outcomes of the current review could 
include a prohibition of connected party disposals by administrators,14 the imposition of 
requirements or conditions on future connected party sales,15 or conceivably no legislative action, 
instead continuing to rely on industry self-regulation (which itself could be subject to further 
reform). Should connected party sales be allowed to continue on a legislative footing, paragraph 60A 
makes wide provision for possible outcomes, as to the nature, application, and identity of the 
imposer of possible requirements or conditions.16  
With the provisions of paragraph 60A seemingly a failsafe in the event that industry-led reforms 
suggested by the Graham Review do not address the issues identified therein, consideration of the 
Graham Review findings, recommendations and subsequent reforms is needed. 
 
                                                          
_summary.pdf> accessed 14 January 2018; Haywood, M, ‘Pre-pack administrations’ Insolv. Int. 2010, 23(2), 17-
22; and Walton, P, ‘Pre-packin' in the UK’ I.I.R. 2009, 18(2), 85-108 
8 Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 versions 1 and 2, available at 
<www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/technical_library/SIPS/SIP%2016%20Version%203%20Nov%202015.pdf> 
accessed 14 January 2018 
9 See for example Umfreville, C, Walton, P and Wilson, P, “Pre-Pack Empirical Research: Characteristic and 
Outcome Analysis of Pre-Pack Administration” (2014) (“The Wolverhampton Report”) p.85 available at: 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/graham-review-into-pre-pack-administration> accessed 14 January 
2018 The scarcity of going concern sales in administrations commencing in 2010 not involving a pre-packaged 
sale was noted in the Wolverhampton Report 
10 IA 1986 Schedule B1 para 60(2) 
11 Ibid para 60A(10) 
12 Ibid para 60A(8)-(9) 
13 Ibid paras 60A(3)-(6) Connected persons are defined quite broadly, in particular including companies in a 
manner which is wider than the definition of an associate company pursuant to s.435 IA 1986 
14 Ibid para 60A(1)(a) 
15 Ibid para 60A(1)(b) 
16 Ibid para 60A(2) and (7) 
4. The Graham Review  
Teresa Graham CBE was commissioned by then Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 
Vince Cable to lead an independent review of the pre-pack process as part of the Coalition 
Government’s ‘Transparency and Trust’ agenda.17 The terms of reference of the review were: 
 “To assess the long term impact of pre-pack deals to form a view as to whether they 
encourage growth and employment; and whether they provide the best value for creditors 
as a whole; 
 To assess the usefulness of the pre-pack procedure in the context of business rescue 
generally, using international comparisons as and when appropriate; 
 To assess whether pre-packs cause detriment to any particular groups of creditors and 
specifically whether unsecured creditors are disadvantaged; 
 To assess whether there are any practices associated with pre-packs which cause harm.”18 
The Graham Review was underpinned by both qualitative and quantitative data, with 
recommendations for reform made where perceptions and anecdotal evidence gleaned from 
speaking with those affected by pre-packs (including suppliers, landlords, insolvency practitioners 
and lawyers) coincided with the quantitative data presented in the ‘Wolverhampton Report.’19 A 
number of positives, as well as areas requiring improvement, in the operation of pre-packs were 
identified and set out in the Graham Review.  
 
4.1 Benefits of pre-packs 
The preservation of employment secured by the continuation of business in a pre-pack was deemed 
a key benefit. In addition to the wider socio-economic advantage of continued employment, 
avoiding redundancy also benefits the insolvent company’s creditors by reducing the possible 
preferential and unsecured claims. Furthermore, pre-packing offers significant cost advantages to 
alternative upstream procedures prior to formal insolvency, and the flexibility provides some wider 
benefit for the economy by attracting relocations from other jurisdictions. Finally, whilst deferred 
consideration was prevalent, and often represented a high proportion of the purchase price, it was 
fully paid in most cases and often backed by security, thereby not undermining unsecured 
creditors.20 
 
4.2 Areas for improvement 
Aside from these positive aspects of the pre-pack, the Graham Review identified three key areas in 
need of improvement, all linked to the lack of transparency around the process. The first area 
suggested for improvement was the quality of marketing undertaken prior to a pre-pack sale. A 
potential dual benefit was identified: the receipt of a better sale price and improved creditor 
                                                          
17 Graham (n 1) p. 3 See ‘Transparency & Trust: Enhancing The Transparency of UK Company Ownership and 
Increasing Trust In UK Business’ (DBIS, July 2013) available at 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/212079/bis-13-959-transparency-
and-trust-enhancing-the-transparency-of-uk-company-ownership-and-increaing-trust-in-uk-business.pdf> 
accessed 14 January 2018 
18 Graham (n 1) para 5.3 
19 Graham (n 1) paras 5.29-5.35 
20 Graham (n 1) paras 3.4-3.7 and 7.57-7.62 
perception that they are getting the best deal, both of which should improve confidence in the 
process. Linked to this was the second area requiring improvement, the explanation of the valuation 
methodology adopted. Whilst the Wolverhampton Report recorded independent valuations in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, the Graham Review revealed concerns around the transparency of 
these valuations. Finally, it was identified that being able to demonstrate the future viability of the 
purchasing company could improve public perception and address supplier concerns.  In addition to 
these three core areas for improvement, the Graham Review also identified the opportunity to 
improve the regulation and monitoring of pre-packs and guidance given to insolvency practitioners 
through SIP 16.21 
 
4.3 Recommendations 
With a self-confessed deregulator at heart leading the Graham Review22 at the time of the Coalition 
Government’s ‘Red Tape Challenge,’23 it is no surprise that legislative action was recommended as a 
last resort.  The Graham Review instead put forward six recommendations for industry-led reform to 
put its house in order. These recommendations, the first two of which were labelled key, can be 
summarised as: 
1. Connected parties voluntarily to approach a ‘pre-pack pool’ prior to the sale, disclosing 
details of the deal for the pool to opine on; 
2. Connected parties voluntarily to complete a ‘viability review’ on the new company; 
3. The Joint Insolvency Committee to consider a redrafted SIP 16 proposed by the Graham 
Review; 
4. Marketing of businesses to be pre-packed to comply with the six principles of good 
marketing, with any deviation brought to the creditors’ attention; 
5. Valuations to be carried out by a valuer with professional indemnity insurance; and 
6. Monitoring of SIP 16 statements be taken on by the Recognised Professional Bodies, rather 
than the Insolvency Service. 
All of these recommendations were, to some extent, implemented towards the end of 2015. It is, 
therefore, important to consider how these recommendations were received and implemented by 
the insolvency industry, and in turn the impact of these reforms. 
 
5. Voluntary Industry Measures 
5.1 The Pre-Pack Pool 
The first key recommendation of the Graham Review led to the launch of the Pre-Pack Pool (“the 
Pool”) on 1st November 2015. A private limited company, independent of both government and the 
insolvency and restructuring profession, the Pool is comprised of experienced business people who 
offer an opinion on a proposed connected-party pre-packaged sale. Referral to the Pool is not 
compulsory, but at the discretion of the purchaser, who can also choose whether or not the opinion 
is shared with the proposed administrator. The insolvency practitioner is simply required to inform 
                                                          
21 Graham (n 1) paras 3.8 -3.13 
22 Graham (n 1) p.5 
23 See <www.redtapechallenge.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/> accessed 14 January 2018 
the purchaser of their ability to seek the Pool’s opinion and to include any opinion it receives in its 
SIP 16 statement. 
A purchaser who chooses to approach the Pool may submit whatever information it considers 
relevant. In the absence of specific requirements, suggested information includes details of company 
officers, their previous involvement in pre-packs, events leading to the proposed sale, why a pre-
pack is necessary and what changes will be implemented in the new company.24 The submission is 
then reviewed by one of the Pool members who will offer one of three opinions: 
1. The case for the pre-pack is not unreasonable; 
2. The case for a pre-pack is not unreasonable but there are minor limitations in the evidence 
provided; or 
3. The case for a pre-pack is not made. 
Although an opinion that ‘the case for a pre-pack is not made’ would suggest that the transaction is 
not viable, the Pool does not have any power to determine whether the proposed pre-pack can 
proceed. It is the responsibility of the administrator, who may not be provided with a copy of the 
opinion to reflect upon, ultimately to determine whether or not to proceed. 
In its first fourteen months of operation, the Pool experienced rather low take up. According to SIP 
16 records filed with the Recognised Professional Bodies, 192 of 405 pre-packs in this period (or 
47.4%) involved connected party sales. Yet there were only 53 referrals to the Pool, representing 
27.6% of eligible transactions.25 Perhaps given both the novelty of the Pool and voluntary 
participation this low uptake is not surprising.  
It should be noted that 47 of the 53 referrals (88.7%) received a positive, though sometimes 
qualified, opinion, with only 6 negative opinions, four of which related to a group transaction.26 
Furthermore, the incidence of connected party pre-packs appears to be lower during this period, 
representing around half of all pre-packs, than compared with data from 2010 and 2011 which 
estimates over 70% of pre-packs were to connected parties.27 This data represents conflicting 
possibilities for the efficacy of the Pool. On the one hand, perhaps purchasers are not making 
submissions to avoid a possible negative response, with only those confident of a positive outcome 
utilising the Pool. Or on the other hand, as the Pre-Pack Pool Annual Review suggests, perhaps the 
“reforms have deterred some connected party pre-packs being proposed in the first place.”28 Or 
then again, perhaps purchasers acting in a time and cost sensitive environment are eschewing the 
delay and £800 plus VAT fee which are not obligatory in order to focus on the proposed transaction. 
With uptake apparently increasing towards the end of 2016, it is too early to form a conclusion as to 
the operation of the Pool at this stage.29 
 
                                                          
24 See <www.prepackpool.co.uk/guidance-documents> accessed 14 January 2018 
25 Insolvency Service, ‘2016 Annual Review of Insolvency Practitioner Regulation’ (The Insolvency Service 
March 2017) pp.7-8 available at <www.gov.uk/government/publications/insolvency-practitioner-regulation-
process-review-2016> accessed 14 January 2018 
26 Pre-Pack Pool ‘Annual Review 2016’ (Pre-Pack Pool Ltd March 2017) p. 5 available at: 
<www.prepackpool.co.uk/uploads/files/documents/Pre-pack%20Pool%20Annual%20Review%202016-17.pdf> 
accessed 14 January 2018 
27 Ibid p.7 
28 Ibid p.3 
29 Ibid p.2 
5.2 The Viability Review 
The second key recommendation of the Graham Review was the introduction of a viability review 
where the purchaser is a connected party. Intended to address the higher prevalence of subsequent 
failure amongst connected party purchasers, the viability review is to be completed by the purchaser 
stating how the company would survive for at least twelve months. This includes a narrative detail of 
how the business would differ from that of the old company, to prevent subsequent failure. The SIP 
16 statement circulated to creditors would either attach the viability statement received or report 
that it has been requested but not received. 
Although it is listed as a suggested item of supporting evidence for submission to the Pool, 
completion of the viability review and sharing it with the Pool and administrator is purely 
voluntary.30  As with the referral rate to the Pool, the submission of viability reviews is 
disappointingly low. Only 37 viability reviews were submitted between 1 November 2015 and 31 
December 2016, representing 69.8% of referrals to the pre-pack pool and just 19.3% of all connected 
sales.31 
This low incidence is not really surprising, as directors are likely wary of the risk of subsequent action 
that a viability statement could expose them to. The Graham Review suggested that should the 
purchaser subsequently fail, the viability statement would be available for consideration by the 
insolvency office holder to assist assessment of the conduct of the purchaser’s management, and 
ascertaining whether any action should be taken against them (though how it would be available is 
not clear).32 In light of this risk, directors would be wise to take professional advice on any viability 
statement proffered. At a time and cost sensitive juncture, that such a voluntary measure is 
regularly ignored is understandable. 
5.3 SIP 16 Reforms 
The remaining recommendations all led to changes to the contents and use of the SIP 16 statement 
by insolvency practitioners. The revisions to SIP 16 recommended by the Graham Review have in 
essence been adopted in full. In addition to reporting on the use of the Pool and provision of a 
viability statement, the revised SIP 16 requires details of the marketing activities undertaken and 
valuations obtained by the insolvency practitioner prior to the pre-packaged sale. 
The research underpinning the Graham Review revealed that cases with no marketing returned less 
money for creditors. The latest reforms to SIP 16 aimed to improve the quality of marketing 
undertaken, and in turn improve confidence in pre-packs. Underpinning this strategy is the “comply 
or explain” principle, requiring insolvency practitioners to explain any deviation from requirements 
for broadcast marketing, strategy explanation, independence, publicising rather than simply 
publication and online communications.33 Little can be said of the impact of these changes without 
significant further study. The Insolvency Service’s 2016 Annual Review of Insolvency Practitioner 
Regulation reports marketing activity being recorded in 290 of the 405 SIP 16 statements submitted 
to the Recognised Professional Bodies.34 This shows that marketing activities were carried out in 7 
out of every 10 pre-packs. It is not clear, however, what this marketing involved, whether it relates 
to connected party sales or whether the principles identified by the Graham Review are being 
                                                          
30 See <www.prepackpool.co.uk/guidance-documents> accessed 14 January 2018 
31 Insolvency Service (n 25) p.8 
32 Graham (n 1) para 9.18 
33 Graham (n 1) paras 9.23-9.26 
34 Insolvency Service (n 25) p.8 
adhered to. Given the high rate of non-compliance of SIP 16s since the reforms were introduced 
(38% were deemed non-compliant), it is possible that some may relate to a deficiency in the 
reporting of marketing activities.35 
Building on the reforms to SIP 16 introduced in 2013, which required details of the identity and 
independence of valuers, the valuation methodology and rationale, together with the valuation and 
reason for any variance in the sale price, the revised SIP 16 requires a statement that the valuer has 
professional indemnity insurance or an explanation why it does not. This is intended to improve 
confidence in the valuation through the indirect regulation by insurance providers. No information 
on compliance with this reform has been published, so it is not possible to reflect on its efficacy, 
though R3 has suggested it has gone down well in practice.36 
Finally, SIP 16 statements are now being monitored by the Recognised Professional Bodies. Whilst 
the high incidence of non-compliant statements is of concern, the differences reported by each 
regulator suggests that this may be down to different approaches being adopted: for example, the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales reported a compliance rate of 39% 
compared with 91% for the Insolvency Practitioners’ Association. It should also be noted that the 
vast majority of compliance issues were deemed not serious. As insolvency practitioners become 
more accustomed to the revised forms and regulators become more proficient in their monitoring, it 
would be expected that rates of non-compliance will decrease. The very small number of sanctions 
imposed by the regulators on insolvency practitioners for non-compliance with SIP 16 would appear 
to support this view.37  
 5.4 Review of the reforms 
These reforms were introduced to improve transparency of connected party pre-pack sales and, in 
turn, to improve confidence in the process. To date, the published data on use of the Pool and 
submission of viability statements suggest that these are being under-utilised. The publication of the 
Pool’s second annual report later this year will far more revealing of the uptake, and in turn 
effectiveness, of these reforms as they bed in. 
The Pool in particular, and by extension the use of the viability statement as a recommended 
document for submission, have been welcomed by industry. Oliver Parry of the Institute of Directors 
views the Pool as “an important step in de-stigmatising the pre-pack administration regime, which in 
many cases represents by far the best outcome for creditors of distressed businesses.”38 However, it 
is acknowledged that the Pool needs to be used more. Philip Ling of the Chartered Institute of Credit 
Management believes that “... the laudable aims of The Pool will only be realised if The Pool is more 
widely promoted.”39 According to the Pool, it is the responsibility of the insolvency profession and 
                                                          
35 Insolvency Service (n 25) p.7 The vast majority of non-compliant statements are reported to be of a 
technical, non-serious nature 
36 R3, ‘Government pre-pack review opportunity for improvement – R3’ (R3, 13 December 2017) 
<www.r3.org.uk/index.cfm?page=1114&element=31163&refpage=1008> accessed 14 January 2018 
37 Insolvency Service (n 25) pp.13-16 Just two sanctions were imposed in relation to SIP 16 in 2016 relating to 
members regulated by ICAEW. IPA has imposed one Disciplinary Consent Order to date in respect of  failure to 
comply with the revised SIP 16 guidelines, see <www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/regulatory-
notices/regulatory-notices> accessed 14 January 2018 
38 Pre-pack Pool (n 26) p.8 
39 Ibid p.6 
creditors to make connected party purchasers aware of its availability, and to put pressure on them 
to use it.40 
The pre-packaged sale in administration has become a core fixture in the restructuring and 
insolvency industry, with connected party transactions representing around half of recent 
transactions and far more historically. The importance is underlined by Duncan Swift, deputy vice 
president of R3, who states that “[w]ithout pre-packs, it would be harder to rescue businesses and 
more jobs would be put at risk ... [and] creditors would lose money.”41 Whilst the Government could 
decide to ban connected party pre-packs (or, indeed more widely, connected party sales) through 
exercise of its power under paragraph 60A, this would seem unwise, both in the context of the 
importance of the pre-pack in the UK, but also the approach being taken in other jurisdictions. 
 
6. The Pre-Packaged Sale: An International Perspective 
6.1 Europe 
Pre-packing is not unique to the UK. The Graham Review highlighted that equivalent processes were 
available in a number of other EU Member States, including France, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands.42 What distinguishes these regimes from that in the UK is the involvement of either the 
court or the creditors in the approval of the proposed transaction. This is also an area of 
development at present. For example, in the Netherlands steps have been taken to put pre-packs on 
a legislative footing, with the Dutch Government proposing the draft Continuity of Enterprises Act I 
(Wet Continuiteit Ondernemingen I, or WCO I) in June 2014. The passage of the Act has been 
delayed by opposition questions, then elections and efforts to form a new coalition, and more 
recently in anticipation of and then the aftermath of the European Court of Justice decision in 
Federatie Nederlandse Vakvereniging and Others v Smallsteps BV (known as the Smallsteps case).43  
The Dutch pre-pack currently operates without legislative footing and is permitted in eight of the 
eleven district courts. The proposed Continuity of Enterprises Act I seeks to put this process on a 
statutory basis to be adopted by all courts, offering a framework to ensure supervision by the courts, 
protection of employees and safeguards against abuse. There are not, however, express provisions 
relating to connected party sales. The draft legislation currently lies before the Senate following 
adoption by the House of Representatives in June 2016 and is subject to further consultation.44  
 
6.2 Australia 
Further afield, pre-packs are also being pushed on to the political agenda in Australia. The pre-pack 
has traditionally been rejected in Australia, with issues such as the independence of insolvency 
practitioners advising pre-appointment and the importance assigned to creditor input operating as a 
                                                          
40 Ibid p.3 
41 R3 (n 36) 
42 Graham (n 1) p.28 
43  Case C-126/16 Federatie Nederlandse Vakvereniging and Others v Smallsteps BV [2017] ECR I-489 The 
decision of the ECJ in Smallsteps echoed that of the Court of Appeal in Key2Law Surrey LLP v De’Antiquis [2011] 
EWCA Civ 1567 
44 For an overview of the proposals and the legislative history see 
<www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/34218_wet_continuiteit> accessed 14 January 2018 
bar to its emergence.45 In some spheres this stance does not appear to be changing. In the recent 
Federal Court of Australia case In the Matter of Ten Network Holdings Ltd (In Administration), 
O’Callaghan J reflecting on the possibility of an insolvency practitioner being appointed as voluntary 
administrator having substantively advised or assisted on a pre-pack, opined that “it is difficult to 
imagine a situation in which the taking of such an appointment ... would ever be countenanced.”46 
However, there are calls for the introduction of a pre-pack regime. 
In response to increasing costs to the Fair Entitlements Guarantee Scheme (similar to the National 
Insurance Fund in the UK), in part attributable to the use of insolvency mechanisms by employers to 
shift costs on to the scheme, the Australian Government launched a consultation on reform 
proposals in May 2017.47 This has been seen as an opportunity to introduce the pre-pack in 
Australia. Richard Fisher AM, Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Sydney and contributor as 
a Commissioner to the Australian Law Reform Commission 1988 General Insolvency Inquiry (known 
as the Harmer Report), set out in his response to the consultation how the introduction of pre-packs 
could mitigate the effect of corporate failures on the Fair Entitlements Guarantee Scheme.48 Echoing 
the recommendation of the 2015 Productivity Commission Report on Business Set-up, Transfer and 
Closure and reflecting on the findings of the Graham Review, Fisher calls for the creation of “a 
legislative environment which facilitates the preservation of either companies or their businesses 
and secures the ongoing engagement of the company’s employees.”49 This suggestion recognises 
both the effectiveness of the pre-pack in preserving employment and the lack of suitable 
mechanisms for smaller companies in Australia. The risk of a pre-pack facilitating fraudulent phoenix 
activity is acknowledged. As such, rather than restricting connected party transactions per se, Fisher 
recommends a clear legislative framework combined with insolvency practitioner regulation and 
standards on top of the initiatives proposed in the consultation itself. Fisher’s suggestions include 
limiting supervision to a panel of insolvency practitioners, limiting access to smaller companies, and 
ensuring creditor communication and transparency similar to that provided by SIP 16.50  
The Australian Government’s response to the consultation is yet to be published. In light of Fisher’s 
suggestions, and the earlier proposals made by the Productivity Commission in 2015,51 this could 
prove a very interesting period in the development of Australian insolvency law, and worth taking 
note of in the UK. 
 
                                                          
45 See e.g. Wellard, M and Walton, P ‘A Comparative Analysis of Anglo-Australian Pre-packs: Can the Means Be 
Made to Justify the Ends?’ (2012) 21 Int Insol Rev 143  
46 In the Matter of Ten Network Holdings Ltd (In Administration) [2017] BPIR 1707 at 1719 
47 Australian Government, ‘Reforms to address corporate misuse of the FEG scheme’ (The Treasury, 2017) 
<https://treasury.gov.au/consultation/reforms-to-address-corporate-misuse-of-the-feg-scheme/> accessed 14 
January 2018 
48 Fisher, R, ‘Reforms to Address Corporate Misuse of the Fair Entitlements Guarantee Scheme’ Submission to 
the Consultation on Reforms to address corporate misuse of the Fair Entitlements Guarantee scheme (The 
Treasury, May 2017) available at <https://treasury.gov.au/consultation/reforms-to-address-corporate-misuse-
of-the-feg-scheme/> accessed 14 January 2018 
49 Ibid para 2.2 
50 Ibid para 5 
51 Australian Government Productivity Commission, ‘Inquiry Report No.75 Business Set-up, Transfer and 
Closure’ (Productivity Commission, September 2015) available at 
<www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/business/report/business.pdf> accessed 14 January 2018 See in 
particular Recommendation 14.3 
7. Possible Reforms in the UK 
With the pre-packaged sale in insolvency seemingly becoming more acceptable elsewhere (certainly 
to the extent of being legislated for), it would seem counterintuitive to take steps to prohibit a 
significant proportion of the pre-pack market in the UK. The first Pre-Pack Pool Annual Review notes 
that it “would be a shame to lose [pre-packs]: fewer business rescues, more job losses, and lower 
returns to creditors are possible outcomes in such a scenario.”52 The latter two of these outcomes 
will be of particular political concern. Employment and job preservation are always a priority of 
government. With the current desire to promote the UK in the World Bank’s Doing Business 
rankings,53 any action that could result in lower returns to creditors could negatively impact the UK’s 
ranking for insolvency outcomes, and in turn the overall rankings, so would most likely want to be 
avoided. The UK has fallen from sixth for insolvency outcomes in 2012 to fourteenth in 2018. Whilst 
there are some questions about the methodology adopted by the World Bank,54 the Government 
will want to avoid taking action that could cause further decline to the UK’s standing, especially 
given the importance of attracting investment post-Brexit.  
As considered above, paragraph 60A allows considerable scope for potential reform. So what 
reforms should the Government consider?  
A common feature of pre-pack regimes in other jurisdictions is the involvement of the court or 
creditors in approving the process. Could a similar approach be adopted in the UK? Involving the 
court in the approval of commercial matters would be contrary to tradition. As Neuberger J set out 
in Re T&D Industries plc, “[c]ommercial and administrative decisions are for [the administrator], and 
the court is not here to act as a sort of bomb shelter for him.”55 With a pre-pack in essence an 
extension of the principle of the early sale permitted by Neuberger J, a requirement for court 
approval would not be a logical progression. Whilst the Chancery Division is blessed with a fine 
bench, it is not a specialist insolvency court akin to the Bankruptcy Courts in the United States. 
Similarly, the involvement of creditors does not seem likely. Both court and creditor involvement in 
the pre-pack process were suggested by the 2010 ‘Consultation / Call for Evidence: Improving the 
transparency of, and confidence in, pre-packaged sales in administrations.’ Neither was 
implemented though, in part due to perceived increased costs and delays which could impact 
viability.56 Furthermore, neither court nor creditor approval featured in the Graham Review in 2014. 
The regulation of insolvency practitioners and their conduct of pre-packs, primarily through the SIP 
16 regime does appear to have improved matters. As Teresa Graham reflected, the second version 
of SIP 16 introduced in November 2013 “was a big step in the right direction,” which her proposed 
reforms intended to further progress.57 The information required to be disclosed by insolvency 
practitioners through SIP 16 statements, since the first version was introduced in October 2009, has 
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progressively addressed the lack of information provided to creditors in early pre-packs identified by 
Sandra Frisby in 2007.58 There is potentially still room for improvement here, however. Following the 
Graham Review reforms, the onus is on the insolvency practitioner to make the purchaser aware of 
the availability and role of the Pool and viability review, with a requirement to report on the same in 
the SIP 16 statement. Perhaps the onus could be shifted from the insolvency practitioner. 
A guiding principle of the Graham Review was that the state should legislate as a last resort, with 
market participants addressing matters they can remedy or mitigate.59 Although referral to the Pool 
and undertaking a viability review for consideration are subject to the discretion of the purchaser, 
arguably behaviour could be influenced by the market. For example, if credit managers were to deny 
credit to a connected party purchaser unless it had obtained a positive opinion from the Pool, 
directors would be encouraged to engage with the process.60 This requires a joined up approach 
from a wide variety of sectors, and may be too much to hope for. The low take up of the Pool to date 
does not inspire confidence here. 
Ultimately, the Pool needs “to be used for it to be useful.”61 Perhaps the most logical reform is to 
take the positive offering of the Pool and make its use mandatory for all connected party pre-packs. 
In doing so, a list of prescribed documents for submission could be drawn up, rather than the 
existing suggestive list. This could include the provision of a viability statement following a viability 
review. In turn, the opinion of the Pool could be provided directly to both the purchaser and 
insolvency practitioner, rather than relying on the purchaser for onward transmission. This would 
ensure that the insolvency practitioner is fully informed when entering into any transaction. 
Additionally, should the Pool return a negative opinion and the connected party withdraws, the 
insolvency practitioner could refer to this when reporting to creditors in a subsequent insolvency, if 
a rescue is not possible or a lower realisation achieved. Additionally it would be valuable, as R3 has 
suggested, that the insolvency practitioner also be able to provide information to the Pool to ensure 
it is fully informed.62 
There would no doubt be some opposition to mandating referral to the Pool. Not least, there would 
be additional costs incurred in producing the documentation, including the viability review, as well 
as the referral fee. However, these appear to be barriers to the use of the Pool at present, together 
with the possible adverse consequences of providing a viability statement considered above. The 
most effective manner to overcome these, and further improve both creditor and market confidence 
in the pre-pack process, would be to impose the requirement under the retained powers in 
Paragraph 60A. By doing so, the issues with the pre-pack regime identified by the Graham Review 
could be addressed universally, rather than on a selective basis. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Underlying the reforms introduced by the Graham Review was the concept of comply or explain. 
Combined, all of the reforms have the potential to address the issues of transparency of and 
confidence in the pre-pack process identified by the Graham Review. However, as currently adopted, 
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the two key recommendations require the connected party purchaser to comply, and the insolvency 
practitioner to explain. With the variety of factors identified to dissuade a purchaser from both 
interacting with the Pool and providing relevant information to the proposed administrator, and the 
difficulty of achieving market regulation, the powers in paragraph 60A Schedule B1 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 could be used to mandate both key recommendations. With the ongoing impact in 
Parliament of preparations for Brexit and beyond, this could offer further opportunity for the 
implementation of the essence of the Graham Review reforms, whilst placing minimal demands on 
Parliamentary time. In the face of developments in the insolvency frameworks in other jurisdictions, 
the recent trend of the UK falling down the World Bank rankings for insolvency outcomes, and the 
uncertainty of Brexit on the horizon, this is not a time for inaction. Rather, the Government needs to 
ensure that the UK regime is as competitive and reliable as it possibly can be. As Teresa Graham 
concluded: “The benefits that pre-packing brings to the UK’s insolvency framework mean that 
reform of the process is worthwhile.”63 It would just seem that the reform is not quite complete. 
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